Supply-chain-hardened agent
socket (package-risk telemetry) → snyk (CVE scan) → sandboxed execution (no maintained tool in the catalogue). Intercepts hallucinated / malicious packages before they reach the dev machine.
Description
Composition for the `supply_chain_attack` FailureMode, targeting both the Spracklen/Lanyado slopsquatting class and classical CVE-poisoned dependency attacks. Stage 1: socket inspects every `install` candidate for risk signals (newly registered, typosquat distance to popular packages, suspicious maintainer patterns, install-time shell hooks). Blocks before download. Stage 2: snyk performs vulnerability scanning on packages that pass the socket gate, using both public CVE feeds and its own research database. Stage 3: the agent's workflow runs inside a sandboxed dev environment so that even a slipped-through package cannot touch the host filesystem or credentials. The stack names no tool for this stage: the one it named, daytona, is archived upstream (see notes).
Stack
Ordered composition. Each stage consumes the output of the one before it.
Targets failure modes
- Supply-chain attack — Slopsquatting, typosquatting, compromised MCP servers.
Notes
This is the Lanyado-style slopsquatting defense. Evidence tier `case_studied` because Socket and Snyk both publish case studies on their own mitigations; no independent benchmark against the Spracklen dataset yet exists. On 2026-11-21 a sentence about Daytona's "signed-manifest model" for MCP servers was removed: the KG records `signed_manifest: false` for Daytona. The review of the same day also found the Daytona repository archived (last push 2026-07-24), and daytona was then removed from `stack`: the sandbox stage has had no maintained tool in the catalogue since. The other sandbox entries (e2b, modal) were not put in its place; choosing one is an editorial decision that has not been made.