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Tools

Semgrep

17,880

Fast, rule-based static analysis with a pattern syntax that mirrors source code.

Detection Post-generation Fully autonomous Program Stable Activity band A Environment
Activity band details

Activity band A to F: a bin of a score that adds GitHub stars (log scale), a push to the upstream repository in the 12 months before `as_of`, the number of declared integration surfaces and, where the catalogue records them, citing papers and benchmark evaluations. It measures popularity and activity. It is not a level of evidence: no band means a paper cites the tool or that it was measured. Recency is judged as of 2026-11-22.

Computed band: A (raw score 7.2). Shown band: A .

Facets: documented_in=0evaluated_on=2integration_surfaces=1.5paper_citations=0recent_push=2stars=1.7

Source of truth: pipeline/maturity/score.py

Measured on SAICA-Bench in this configuration

Each row is one run of Semgrep, set up by us as its run card says, on one labelled set of faulty and clean samples (how we test). It says what that configuration flagged on that set, not how good Semgrep is in general: another model, another input or the tool's own defaults could score differently. J = TPR - FPR, on the answers that carry a verdict. 0% is chance, 100% flags every bad sample and no clean one. J is the sort key within a mode; each row also has false alarms per 100 clean changes and precision at 1%, 5% and 20% prevalence.

Set Configuration and run card J (95% interval) TPR FPR No verdict Cost per 1,000 reviews
Security vulnerability
Real agent output
semgrep (p/python + p/security-audit)
Catalog tool · Free program · own check · outside design scope
Not ranked: outside the tool's design scope: a pattern scanner: most flaws in this set are missing checks and logic-level flaws that its patterns do not describe.
Version
semgrep 1.96.0
What it was shown
patched files on disk; added line numbers
Counts as flagged when
Flagged when any finding lands on a line the patch added.
First run
2026-11-19/20
Check
own check: the tool ran its own built-in check
Catalog
in the catalog
Design scope
outside design scope: a pattern scanner: most flaws in this set are missing checks and logic-level flaws that its patterns do not describe
Runs
1,702; failed 51 (3.0%): setup error 51
Samples
1,243 bad, 459 clean
Answers with no verdict
51 (32 bad, 19 clean): setup error 51
Cost
free

How this run differs from the tool's defaults

  • rule packs p/python and p/security-audit, fetched at run time; their rule versions are not pinned
  • only findings on lines the patch added are counted
+2.5%
−3.6% to +8.5%
11.4% 8.9% 51 $0

An answer with no verdict (failed call, blocked request, text cut by the token budget, no verdict in the text) is unreadable: it is left out of the rates and counted beside them, per label. “~” marks an estimated cost. SAICA-Bench results v2.0.0, built 2026-11-22.

Description

Open-source static-analysis engine that matches syntactic and lightweight-dataflow patterns written in a source-code-like DSL, spanning 30+ languages. Ships a large community rule registry (OWASP Top 10, secrets, framework anti-patterns) and supports custom rules. Runs in CLI, pre-commit, and CI; Semgrep AppSec Platform adds hosted findings triage.

Why it's included

Occupies detection x post_generation x fully_autonomous for security_vulnerability: the rule registry flags injection, weak crypto and secrets on the finished diff (the Community Edition analyses one file at a time; cross-file dataflow is in the paid engine). The supply_chain_attack tag rests on Semgrep Supply Chain, a commercial part of the AppSec Platform, not on the open-source engine this record describes. The 2026-11-20 tag audit removed dependency_blindness: no shipped rule flags re-implemented library functionality; that would need custom rules per codebase (research/fm_tag_audit/final_table.csv).

Security notes

Core engine is LGPL-2.1 and runs fully offline; the default rule registry is pulled from semgrep.dev and should be pinned by commit or vendored for regulated builds. The hosted AppSec Platform is SaaS and sends findings (not raw source by default) upstream; self-hosted deployments keep everything on-prem. Rules execute as pattern matching, not arbitrary code, so registry compromise is bounded to false-positive/negative impact rather than RCE.

Addresses failure modes

These tags are the catalog's claim about what Semgrep is built to catch or prevent. A tag is not a test result. The rows under Measured on SAICA-Bench are the evidence, for the sets and the configuration we ran. Not measured here: Supply-chain attack.

Techniques

pattern-based-static-analysistaint-analysiscustom-rule-authoringci-gatingsecret-scanning

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